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The banking crisis revealed severe shortcomings in the area of monetary 
policy, deregulation, financial innovation, and government policies. Given 
the negative impact it has had on the global economy, it requires an 
analysis of the factors that contributed to its onset, its particularities and 
the solutions implemented. The aim of the paper is to draw a clear picture 
of the phenomenon and to identify possible solutions. By analyzing the 
causes and evolution of the recent banking crisis, the authors suggest 
strategies aimed at avoiding similar future banking crises.  






Many analysts believe the financial crisis is a new phenomenon, 
unprecedented in the world economy. From the moment the real estate credit 
crunch has turned into a world financial crisis, central banks and governments of 
developed countries strived to release crediting in order to support the economy, 
which later gradually came into recession. 
Doing a review on the world economy, we identified other crises 
unraveled in countries like Brazil or Mexico, but these particular crises were due 
to inappropriate government policies based on low taxation and a fixed exchange 
currency rate. 
“Allah’s punishment”, “Pearl Harbor’s economy”, “the explosion of the 
financial bubble”, “the new spill”, “vortex” are some of the phrases used by 
specialists like Warren Buffett or Alan Greenspan to define the global financial 
crisis. This unprecedented event has left its mark on all countries worldwide. 
Given the fact that it had a negative impact, the situation requires an analysis of 
the factors which led to it. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to draw a clearer 
picture of the phenomenon and to identify possible solutions. 
Since 2007, the artificial growth of the US real estate market has 
generated increasingly adverse consequences. This process was supported by the 
development of the subprime mortgage market and financial derivatives. Once 
collapsed, the subprime market has affected not only the banking system, but also 
the economy as a whole. 
Irrational factors have fuelled the development of real estate sector, 
among which the most important were: low benchmark interest rate dating back 
to 2001; tax relief granted by the U.S. government to the banking system and the 
capital market regarding costs of mortgage deregulation; lack of correlation 
between wages and productivity; financial innovation and investors’ greed. 
The banking crisis is a subcategory of the financial risis consisting in 
moments of panic, temporary confusion regarding incidents within the financial 
system. The crisis began in the U.S., but because of deregulation and financial 
liberalization, this phenomenon has spread to Europe and other continents, having 
a negative impact on the economy and forcing banks to deal with a difficult 
situation. After receiving bailouts from the government, some banks were 
nationalized, others were saved, but in many cases they went bankrupt. 
After analyzing the causes and evolution of the recent banking crisis, the 
authors suggest some changes aimed at avoiding future similar banking crises. 
Thus, the array of recommendations contains, among thers, the following: 
rethinking the remuneration system for employees within credit institutions; a 
proper surveillance of rating agencies, increased attention and adequate analyses 
when granting credits. 
 
 
2. CAUSES OF THE BANKING CRISIS 
US government policies were based on the premise that every American 
must own a property, but also on facilities offered by the IRS in that taxpayers 
could deduct the interest from their taxable income. This implied that all 
homeowners incurred a financial risk. The risk was shared by more than 22 
million Americans, who in the period 2005-2007 bought new or old homes and 
lost a significant part of their initial investment, after “housing bubble” burst.  
Currently, analysts estimate that more than 10 million American families own 
homes with mortgages exceeding the homes market value.  
Other causes of the current crisis could be identifi d in: the lack of 
regulations for the US banking system; Fed’s lowering the benchmark interest 
after September, 11, 2001 terrorist attack, in order to generate liquidity and 
protect numerous financial institutions against default.  
Most financial professionals singled out the financi l derivatives market 
as a major source of the problem. With its spectacular growth from 106,000 
billion dollars in 2002 to over 531,000 billion dollars in 2008, this market did 
nothing but increase risks rather than limit them aid doubts about how 
companies would exploit them. Derivatives were created as a protection against 
investment losses. These contracts allowed financial service firms and companies 
with adequate liquidity to take more complex risks which normally would have 
been avoided. Alan Greenspan, who spoke several times against imposing 
restrictions on the financial derivatives market, argued in 2003 in front of the US 
Congress that “derivatives were and are an extraordinarily useful vehicle to 
transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing and 
are capable of doing so”.          
The collapse of the US real estate credit market caused massive losses to 
all investors who bought financial assets backed by mortgages. These losses have 
affected credit institutions amid their attempt of covering debts by increasing 
capital through selling shares, which stirred a negative reaction of the capital 
market, a sharp drop in the banking shares, and a sharp reduction in the equity of 
credit institutions. The crisis began only in the US as a subprime lending problem, 
but soon it has spread throughout the world.  
The first signs announcing the deepening of the crisis have been drawn 
by the collapse of investment bank Bear Stearns in the spring of 2008. The bank 
was ultimately saved from bankruptcy by Fed’s intervention which backed the 30 
billion purchase of investment bank JPMorgan. Then the nationalization of 
British bank Northern Rock and Fed’s intervention t save its two giants, Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, followed. 
Several papers elaborate on the recent banking crisis and especially its 
causes, putting under the spotlight the fact that te United States and other 
developed economies have experienced a continuous upward trend of real estate 
prices (Laeven & Valencia, 2010, p. 4). Chart 1 shows a comparison between the 
 
 
evolution of the consumer prices index (CPI) in theousing sector and the 
evolution of the same index, but in other industrie (food, goods, energy, and 
transportation). As reflected in the analyzed data, re l estate prices have increased 
much more than prices in other industries. In 2002, for example, CPI exceeded by 
30.6% the goods price index, by 4.10% the food price index, by 58.6% the energy 
price index and by 27.4% the transportation price index. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the price indices for various industries  
(value 100 corresponds to the period 1982-1984) 
Source: CENSUS database 
 
On one hand, the expansion of the real estate market was supported by 
financial innovation, which allowed the creation of complex derivative 
instruments through which banks exploited the regulation gaps. As shown in 
figure 2, the derivatives market value greatly increased after year 2000. Thus, 
from about 150 trillion dollars in 2000, it rose to 400 trillion dollars in 2006, 
summing up to a percentage increase of 167%. 
 
 
Figure 2. The market value and notional value of the global derivatives market 




CPI transportation  




Source: US Cross-Border Derivatives Data: A User’s Guide, May 2007, p.1, 
available on www.federalreserve.com 
Credit institutions have incurred high risks, capitl adequacy avoiding 
operations by recording off-balance sheet instruments. This way, the off-balance 
sheet set of commitments increased and distorted the structure of the assets within 
the balance sheet. This process has been made possible by giving packaged 
banking mortgages to investment entities called special purpose vehicles (SPV). 
Hence, SPVs took over a series of activities with high risk and low liquidity 
(derivatives that had mortgages underlying assets) and placed them in the 
financial market. This technique of selling loans to investors has transformed the 
traditional role of financial intermediaries on the mortgage market (Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru & Vig, 2010, p.308). Thus, in the years preceding the crisis, 
there was a rapid increase in financial derivative transactions and bank 
indebtedness degree. 
Some market players which have negatively affected th  banking system 
include US government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Ma  and Freddie Mac, 
whose role was to buy and securitize mortgages. Through this activity, they 
generated a systemic risk in the market, contributing to the deepening of the crisis 
(Acharya & Richardson, 2009, p.13). The main problem was the high percentage 
of mortgage backed securities (MBS) they had in their portfolios. Everyone was 
aware that the decline of these companies would have led to massive sales of 
securities, thus affecting the whole financial system. 
Moreover, the sharp rise in house prices was due to the policies pursued 
by governments trying to stimulate the purchase of real estate. One of the 
measures implemented in the US was to allow taxpayers to deduct from their 
taxable income the interest on the mortgage and property taxes. As can be easily 
concluded, the government itself contributed indirectly to the crisis. Another 
element worth mentioning is the benevolent attitude of Alan Greenspan, then 
chairman of the Fed. He was among the specialists supporting the efficiency of 
substandard lending practices and refusing supervision. 
Almost by night, mortgage became extremely affordable and accessible 
for the population, due to reduced requirements of banks, i.e. easing customer 
creditworthiness standards. In addition, the range of assets received as collateral 
significantly expanded. Thus, it led applicants to falsely report income, without 
any written confirmation of salary (Roubini & Mihm, 2010, p.119). The 
borrowers’ situation described above was known under th  acronym NINJA (no 
income, no jobs, no assets). The abovementioned measures have generated a 




Figure 3. Share of liabilities related to mortgage nd consumer loans  
in personal income 
Source: CENSUS database 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of public debt, consumer credit and mortgage 
loans. It can be seen that the share of payment obligations arising from mortgage 
loans (average 10%) is higher than that of consumer credit obligations (average 
6.5%). In addition, by analyzing the time evolution f the related indebtedness, one 
can see that consumption followed a downward trend (from 6.3% in 2000 to 6.24% 
in 2007). Instead, the mortgage indebtedness increased from one year to another 
(from 8.83% in 2000 to 11.25% in 2007). 
In the period 2002-2007, household debt grew much more than that of 
corporations. All these factors led to a financial excess, i.e. the sharp and rapid 
development of the financial market which reached a level that exceeded 
economic needs. On the credit market, public debt was on average 27% in 1998-








Figure 4: Share of total population and total corporate debt in the credit market 
Source: CENSUS database 
Institutional structure also encouraged the crisis. Due to the role of the 










increased security that it would help them in the ev nt of liquidity problems, i.e. 
the onset of a crisis. Financial institutions were not cautious enough to secure 
large volumes of liquid assets as buffer in case of massive withdrawals (Roubini 
& Mihm, 2010, p.129). 
Furthermore, the low interest rate in the years preceding the crisis must 
also be mentioned. In the US, interest rate was significantly mitigated in the 
period 2001-2004. This has led investors to seek new i vestment tools. Thus, 
largely due to the increasing demand, the financial system has developed new 
structures and new tools that seemed to offer higher risk-return reports, but in fact 
were more risky than it seemed (IMF, 2009, p.2). Excess liquidity in the market 
prompted investors to turn to the financial market, namely for innovative financial 
instruments. Figure 5 renders the time evolution of the Fed benchmark rate. If in 
2000 it scored 5.73%, in 2002 it fell up to 1.17%. As a result of the inflationary 
pressures, from 2003 the rate grew constantly, reaching 6.41% in 2007. Mortgage 
rate was also on a similar trend. From 7.52% in 2000, it fell to 5.77% in 2004, 







Figure 5. Evolution of the Fed benchmark rate and the mortgage rate for  
new homes in the US 
Source: CENSUS database 
 
The main consequence of the actions taken by the central bank translated 
into an increase in inflationary pressures. Hence, in the period 2005-2006, the 
interest rate for borrowers increased with disastrou  consequences. Higher 
interest rates led to serious difficulties in mortgages repayment. 
Another shortcoming in the legislation was the method for determining 
the provision for loan losses. It was based on pastinformation involving a tardy 
recognition of excessive risk. This way, unsound lending has been supported for a 
long period. The amount of provisions decreased especially in the period 2002-
2006. Thus, from $51.5 billion in 2002 fell to $29.6 billion in 2006, with a drop 
of 42.55%, as can be seen in figure 6.  
 mortgage rate 
 




Figure 6. Provisions for losses on loans granted by financial institutions in the US 
(billion dollars) 
Source: CENSUS database 
 
Rating agencies had an important role in the development of the crisis, 
especially due to their link with banks and mortgage packages. The agencies were 
giving ratings that were inconsistent with the reality, reflecting too much 
optimism. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the losses from CDOs is that 
most financial assets, that have been blamed and sanctioned afterwards, initially 
received AAA ratings from one or more national credit rating agencies, which 
marked them mainly as a safe investment (Barnett-Har , 2009, p.1). 
Two reasons for this assessment distortion reside in the method of 
paying rating agencies and the complexity of financi l instruments under 
assessment. Regarding remuneration, the agencies wer  paid by the entities under 
their evaluation, thus being motivated to issue positive scores in order to receive 
commissions. The conflict of interests was due to the double role held by rating 
agencies: evaluating banks and advisors regarding the structuring of products to 
maximize rating; receiving payment by those same clients. Regarding derivatives 
complexity, this was due to multiple securitizations of financial instruments. For 
example, through such techniques, the instrument called collateral debt obligation 
(CDO) was created. Some scholars have even argued that leaning on the rating 
agencies was like putting the fox to guard the chicken (Roubini & Mihm, 2010, 
p.120). 
Labor productivity in relation to the earnings/wages has also eased the 
deepening of the crisis. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the three indicators 
relevant to the recent crisis. Unit labor costs are calculated as the ratio between 
the total labor costs and gross domestic product. The second indicator refers to 
the employee compensation divided by the number of employees, and the third 
 
 
indicator is productivity. As one can observe, in most countries, the productivity 
growth rate was far outweighed by the labor cost, i.e. wages. 
 
 
Figure 7. Evolution of labor costs, compensation for labor and labor productivity 
in various countries worldwide - Dynamic Indicators with a mobile basis,  
2001-2006 
Source: OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2008, p. 58, available on 
www.oecd.org 
 
Finally, the factor perceived as the basis of all developments mentioned 
was the excessive greed of those involved in banking processes. Their main 
objective was to maximize profit on a short term and with minimal effort, i.e. 
limiting capital invested. As mentioned by some authors, the situation was 
“staged” about greedy bankers who cashed in hundreds of millions, while 
taxpayers saved institutions from bankruptcy (Dowd, 2009, p.141). 
 
3. CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS  
The current financial crisis was caused by excessiv risk taken by many 
companies in the financial sector. Much of this risk had led employees to 
artificially increase their own wealth and not focus on company objectives. 
As it is stated, “the financial system is the heart of a modern market 
economy” (Kapoor, 2012, p.6). When the system functio s properly, sufficient 
resources are ensured so as to achieve a maximization of productivity. When 
ambiguities occur, the entire economic system is affected. 
 
 
Spain, Greece and Kazakhstan were on the edge of a systemic crisis, 
because they met only two of the six criteria of policy intervention. The recent 
crisis began in the US and Britain in 2007, spreading rapidly to other countries in 
2008. In all those cases, banking systems have shown s me signs of difficulty, 
followed by government interventions (i.e., bailouts) from the first year of the 
crisis. The systemic crisis emerged in 2009 in Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Mongolia, Ukraine, then followed Kazakhstan in 2010 and Nigeria and 
Spain in 2011. 
Table 1 
Countries in crisis and those who were almost on the edge of systemic risk 
 
 
Source: Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p.6 
 
Theoretically speaking, the recent evolution of the economic and 
financial situation in the US contradicts the Keynesian theory: fiscal and 
monetary stimuli resulted in a modest economic growth and a vehement rejection 
of economic policies by public opinion. With a budget deficit of 10% of GDP, the 
Obama administration has opted to maintain the exemptions previously adopted 
 
 
by the Bush administration, adding another extra fee reduction on salaries of civil 
servants. The period 2000-2007 is characterized by a global low interest rate, 
resulting from the existence of a high level of liquidity in countries like China, 
who has foreign reserves and surpluses deposited in current accounts. Thus, in an 
artificial way, exchange rates were maintained at a low level and savings balance 
was positive. The post 2001 pressure made interest rates fell. That situation has 
contributed to an expansion of credit demand and rising of asset prices, which 
preceded the crisis, as happened in the US, where financial products with an 
increased risk and subprime loans were intensively promoted. 
 
Figure 8. Real interest rates in the US (1994-2008) 
Source: Berrell & Davis, 2008, p.3 
 
In this time of recession the state intervened, trying to save many of the 
financial institutions damaged by the crisis. After h lping JP Morgan Chase bank 
to acquire Bear Stearns, the US government bailed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The fall of Lehman Brothers on the 15th of September 2008 represented the 
outburst of the crisis. Soon, AIG, a large insurance company was saved by the US 
Treasury. On the 19th of September 2008, the US Treasury made a temporary 
guarantee program consisting of $50 billion for themutual funds on the market. 
On September, 26, FDIC closed its activities at Washington Mutual. On 
September, 29, 2008, the UK government nationalized Bradford and Bingley, 
institutions which handled mortgages. On, September, 30, 2008, Fortis received 
support from the Government of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. On 
October, 5, German government extended guarantees for the Hypo Real Estate 
bank. 
Kapoor (2012) singles out greedy bankers and regulators involved as the 
masterminds of the crisis. The “credit boom” and lending policies have generated 
a progressive deterioration of the credit market betwe n 2001 and 2007. The 
liquidity crisis has exploded on the interbank market in August 2007. 
 
 
The problems arising from the Lehman Brothers case nd other US 
banks were closely related to the subprime crisis and the liquidity crisis. Two 
lessons must be learned from the Lehman Brothers case: 1) the chaotic 
development of the financial economy has to be stopped; 2) even the most solid 
entities have a finite activity.  
By granting bailouts to credit institutions, the US Treasury became a 
shareholder in Citigroup, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America/ 
Merril Lynch and several others. The measure adopte by the US Treasury of 
purchasing mortgage-backed securities issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in 
September 2008, aimed at defusing the crisis, were not able to eliminate all of the 
“symptoms”. 
In the same period, the giant AIG sought and received a loan from the 
Fed of $85 billion. Currently, AIG faces another round of liquidity problems, thus 
having to request a new Fed emergency aid of $90 billion. 
Fed, European Central Bank and Bank of England announced a dramatic 
relax of the lending terms for their main contractors, namely a majority of 
commercial banks and investment banks. These institutions will be able to 
guarantee loans for a wide variety of financial assets, loans or debts arising from 
speculative investments.  
Last but not least, recent banking events in Cyprus represent another 
effect of the global crisis which also affected theEuro Zone. 
 
4. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Concerning the factors which triggered the crisis and its evolution, in the 
following we recommend some solutions which, if applied, might avoid the 
repetition of such phenomenon. 
A first aspect that comes into our attention is the policy regarding the 
compensation of employees. If their salary package refl cts the positive economic 
results of the company, remuneration policy should also take into account the 
company economic losses. Therefore, in our view, remuneration should be 
redesigned in order to take into account the results of he entity, either positive or 
negative. By this, companies would raise awareness among employees, they 
would consider not only short-term profits, but also the risks associated to the 
financial operations. In addition, another element worth taking into account is an 
assessment of employees based on their work productivity. Thus, financial 
compensation would be made based on performance from several years, and the 
positive results obtained in one year would be correlated with negative results in 
another year. Consequently, by assessing the average performance, companies 
would provide employees with a fairer remuneration. 
 
 
Some specialists (Roubini & Mihm, 2010) even suggest that the 
remuneration received by employees of financial institutions should reside in shares 
within the company. In their view, companies should impose a timeframe in which 
employees would have to keep the shares (i.e., they would not be able to sell shares 
for a decade or until retirement). This way, employees should be more interested in 
the evolution of the company and the impact of its operations (performed by them) 
on financial results. 
Another element which needs to be modified is the remuneration system 
of rating agencies. The conflict of interests in which the rating agencies were 
involved contributed to the deepening of the current crisis: they were both 
consultants and assessors for the banks, so they got to evaluate their own 
proposals. Moreover, the higher the rating, the higher the fees paid by the banks 
to these agencies. The main problem was that credit institutions could choose 
which rating agency to evaluate them. As companies w re interested in receiving 
a higher rating, this was the main criterion in choosing a rating agency. In turn, 
agencies were interested in granting good ratings i order to receive commission 
from their clients. 
In our view, a rotating method for assessing institutions could be 
established, so that each evaluation can be conducte  by another agency. A 
second option would be that all agencies should assess all credit entities and the 
third proposal would involve creating a global rating agency, like an international 
public institution. These institutions would operat on funds collected from the 
entities that would be evaluated according to social, economic and financial 
criteria. By using this method, neutrality and objectivity in the assessments would 
increase. A fourth option would be to prohibit rating agencies to give consultancy 
services to assessed entities, thus eliminating any possible conflict of interests. 
Roubini & Mihm (2010) also proposed that the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) should reduce entry barriers and increase 
competition on the market. 
Other authors have proposed a shift from the institutional perspective. To 
solve the poor discipline of large banks, it is recommended to mitigate their size, 
in order to get back to the status “small enough to fall” (Mehran, Morrison & 
Shapiro, 2011, p.22). 
In our opinion, when referring to the EU, there should be binding rules to 
ease cooperation between member states, measures which have to be clear and 
transparent. On the long run, a single supranational authority such as the US 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) could be established. To our 
knowledge, there are some legislative proposals to create an EU network of 
national deposit guarantees and to have the opportunity of borrowing from other 
member states. The project is quite ambitious, reflecting the cross-border nature of 
member state banks. Another proposal would be to create a single set of rules by 






The banking crisis unraveled due to several financial, economic and 
psychological factors. Even if the US was the epicenter of the crisis, its effects 
have spread rapidly throughout the world by contagion. Moreover, the conditions 
that led to the crisis have been identified in other countries. 
Among the most notable causes of the crisis were: the downward trend of 
the benchmark interest rate; government support for he development of the US 
housing market; financial innovation, which allowed credit institutions to incur 
significant risk; unsupervised activity of credit institutions, due to legislative gaps; 
the conflict of interest in which rating agencies were involved, allowing them to 
overestimate the efficiency of derivatives and grant credit institutions unreal 
scores. 
The current crisis led to a significant decrease in the confidence level of 
consumers, investors and businessmen, which in turnaffected stability and 
economic strength. This created a vicious circle of economic growth based on 
excessive consumption sustained by debts. Deregulation and financial 
liberalization did not generate an efficient allocation of resources.  
Recent measures taken by governments numbered assets acquisition, 
banks recapitalization, injecting liquidity into the banking system. In spite of these 
measures, many banks have not escaped the subprime lending problem. At least in 
Europe, counterbalancing the effects of the financil risis appears to be an 
extremely difficult mission. France, for example, created a sovereign fund to assist 
strategic companies.  
The constant deepening of the financial crisis has imposed consensus 
and (game) coordination among governments and supervisory authorities, in 
order to finally reach the following objectives: 1)more explicit guarantees to 
maintain liquidity in the banking system; 2) supporting the increase of banks 
capitalization (namely, direct participation of the state, with the possibility that, in 
some cases, the state become main shareholder); 3) alternative solutions for 
eliminating non-performing assets from banks balance sheets; 4) decreasing the 
benchmark interest rate; 5) more pragmatic operation l regulations and 
supervision of the banking system.  
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